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We construct a model, via educational expenditure, linking female labor supply to fertility 
and economic growth. Our paper includes three main themes. First, increases in parental time of 
teaching at home and educational expenditure lead to an increase in the level of human capital 
stock. Both home education and school education are inputs of the human capital production 
function. Second, the rising opportunity cost of having children discourages parental demand for 
children and encourages married women’s participation. Finally, more investments in children’s 
human capital result in a higher growth rate. Our model closely follows the process of 
demographic transition. In the developed stage, an economy with a high rate of educational 
expenditure has a low fertility rate, high female participation rate and perpetual growth. Our 





Since Malthus (1798), population has long been recognized as a factor in economic 
development. As women compose around half the population, their contribution to economic 
development is evidenced by their trend of labor force participation in the histories of 
developed economies. When the labor force participation rate of a nation increases, the real 
GNP per capita also rises. The increase in the labor force participation rate mostly comes 
from an increase in the participation of married women. For example, from 1920 onwards, 
the labor force participation of married women in the United States climbed from 31.8% in 
1960 to 40.8% in 1980,
1 while the real GNP per capita was $10,969 in 1960 and $16,790 in 
1980. 
The impressive relationship between human reproduction and women’s work activity 
in an economy has been explored theoretically and empirically. Standing (1983) indicated 
that early research admitted that fertility was inversely related to women’s labor force 
participation.   
Namely, in advanced countries the high level of female participation encouraged low 
fertility. In low-income countries, due to few work opportunities and the low cost of 
childbearing, a high level of fertility has existed with low female participation. Recent 
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research found women who work can afford a larger number of children. Mincer (1985) 
concluded that the interrelationships between fertility and female labor force participation 
may be affected by other variables, notably by the process of economic growth. Especially 
important in this process are the growth of real wage, education, and urbanization. 
This paper constructs a mechanism to show how the female participation rate 
contributes to economic growth. It combines a model of the household’s fertility/labor 
supply choices w ith a growth model in which fertility and economic growth are 
endogenously determined. This study’s main issue is how the female labor supply, through 
the proportion of educational expenditure, affects the accumulation of human capital, the 
level of fertility, and growth. It also shows how an underdeveloped economy can increase its 
growth rate by raising the educational expenditure. 
Some studies of female labor supply and growth have focused on various mechanisms 
by which the two variables are related. Goldin (1986) considered female labor force as one 
of the long-term factors in American economic growth. The paper followed the neoclassical 
Solow model by decomposing the source of growth in total production into the growth in 
different inputs. They concluded that should the female labor force have not expanded over 
1890-1980, the national income per capita would probably have been at least 14% lower than 
it actually was.   
Galor and Weil (1996) explored another mechanism. Their main concern was with 
how growth, via change in women’s relative wage, affected household decisions about 
fertility and female labor force participation, and how these decisions fed back through the 
production mechanism to affect output growth. They found that an increase in capital per 
worker raises women’s relative wage, since capital is more complementary to women’s labor 
input than to men’s. Increasing women’s relative wage reduces fertility, but raises women’s 
participation. Furthermore, lower fertility raises the level of capital per capita and output per 
capita. The increasing growths in capital and output lead to a rapid decline in fertility, but to 
an increase in female labor supply.   
In this paper we present a different mechanism linking female labor supply, fertility 
and growth. First, the production function of human capital has two inputs. One is parental 
time of teaching at home and the other is the educational expenditure. The more time is spent 
teaching at home, or the educational expenditure, the higher is the level of human capital 
accumulation. Second, the level of time cost or monetary cost of children will affect parent’s 
demand for children, and the decision of the mother to work. Finally, the accumulation of 
human capital affects economic growth. More investment in children’s human capital results 
in a higher growth rate. 
Our model’s rationale that human capital accumulated through parental time of 
teaching at home or educational expenditure refers to those studies by Hill and Stafford 
(1974) and Leibowitz (1977). They  showed that those variables relating to family 
background deeply affect the stock of children’s human capital, notably, the quantity of time 
and goods devoted by parents. For pre-school children, the more time mothers spend with 
them will improve their verbal ability. When children grow up, they spend more time in 
school, and parental financial support becomes more important than time. High-income 
parents spend more money on children’s education, and mostly their children have a better 
achievement. The evidences above imply that both parental time and expenditure contribute YANG: EDUCATION, MARRIED WOMEN’S PARTICIPATION RATE AND FERTILITY   
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to the investment in children’s human capital. From the empirical data of Taiwan, the 
proportion of household income spent on education increased from 4.17% in 1972 to 5.72% 
in 1996.
2 The percentage of population over six years old who completed secondary school 
was 13.96% in 1972 and climbed to 46.38% in 1996.
3 
Our model’s other theme focuses on the interrelationship between children’s quality 
and quantity and mothers’ working time. Mincer (1962) demonstrated that due to the income 
effect, given her husband’s income, if a wife expects an increase in wage rate, she will 
decrease any market activity. On the other hand, because of the substitution effect, when the 
opportunity cost of leisure increases, the mother will increase her market activity. In our 
model, other things being equal, when the educational expenditure rises, mothers expect a 
decline in their consumption, and they will increase hours of work to finance the extra 
expense. Moreover, as the cost of schooling increases, mothers will spend more time to teach 
their children at home. Therefore, mothers’ hours of work decrease. Mothers’ decision on 
work then depends on which effect dominates the other. 
The motive for having children in our model is pure altruism. Both quantity and 
quality of children affect parent’s utility. In a developed economy, when parents want to 
raise a high-quality child, a mother will consider to spend more time teaching children at 
home, or disburse more money in school education. Becker and Lewis (1973) indicated that 
since the cost of having an additional child increases, the number of children goes down. In 
an advanced economy, the income effect of the educational expenditure on mothers’ hours of 
work dominates the substitution effect. A higher educational expenditure leads to low 
fertility and high female participation. 
The final theme of our model follows the perspective of the “new growth” theory. 
Most “endogenous growth” theories emphasize that human capital accumulation provides a 
powerful engine in economic growth. We use both mothers’ time teaching at home and 
educational expenditure as inputs of the human capital production. An increase in the 
educational expenditure accelerates economic growth. In addition, we follow Becker, 
Murphy and Tamura (1990) (BMT, hereafter) and Ehrlich and Lui (1991) (EL, hereafter) to 
endogenize population growth. They obtained that a high level of human capital has a higher 
rate of return to human capital. Thus, economies with high human capital will have few 
children and invest more human capital in each child. Those with little human capital do the 
opposite. A similar result can be found in our paper. 
When we consider the proportion of educational expenditure as a policy, we explore 
whether an increase in the proportion of educational expenditure will raise the stock of 
children’s human capital. When the prices of children go up, parental demand for children 
goes down. Higher educational expenses and fewer children encourage mothers’ 
participation in work activity. The rise in mothers’ labor force participation and household 
income raises the investment in children’s human capital. This further discourages fertility 
and increases economic growth. 
Our model also reveals part of a demographic transition. When a country with a small 
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proportion of educational expenditure owns people with a low level of human capital stock, 
the price of children is cheap. This will lead to a substantial population growth. As the 
country develops and the proportion of educational expenditure continues increasing, the 
price of children becomes more expensive. The growth of population then slows down. 
This model may also exhibit multiple equilibria. In a stagnant equilibrium, high 
fertility exists with a low female participation rate. However, in a perpetual growth 
equilibrium, a low fertility rate is present with a high female labor supply. Initial conditions 
may determine a country’s long-run equilibrium. Countries with a low initial level of human 
capital may lead to a stagnant stage with high population growth and low female labor 
supply. Countries with a high initial level of human capital may reach a persistent growth 
stage with low fertility and a high female participation rate. By numerical simulation, we can 
depict the path of economic growth. We find that an autonomous increase in the educational 
expenditure may move the economy from a stagnant stage to a growth one. Empirically, we 
collect Taiwan data to test the prediction of our model. The empirical result shows that our 
theory can explain the growth experience of Taiwan quite well. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II constructs a basic model and 
uses a simulation to demonstrate the path of different equilibria. In Section III, we examine 
Taiwan’s data and verify whether it follows the predictions of our model. Section  IV 
summarizes the results and offers a conclusion. 
 
II. Basic Model   
 
Assume that the population is  t N  units at point  t  in time and each unit points to a 
pair of parents. For simplicity of analysis, we also suppose that a husband cannot affect his 
wife’s decision on the allocation of time.
4 We thereby exclude the role of a husband from our 
model. In particular, the  husband’s income is omitted. Furthermore, following the BMT 
model, we assume that the family dynasty head maximizes a dynastic utility function that 





- + = t t t t V an C V
e                                                   (1) 
 
where  t V  and  1 + t V  denote the utilities of a parent and each child, respectively. Term  t n  is 
the number of children per parent at time  t  and it also denotes the gross growth rate of the 
population. The letter “a ” is the degree of pure altruism of parents toward children, while 
e is the constant elasticity of altruism per child.
5  The restriction on  e is 0 <e< 1. It 
follows that the discount rate of generation  t  decreases in the number of children. 
The consumption is defined as the difference between total production and educational 
expenditure on all children. 
 
4. The empirical data of male labor supply shows that the number of children has little effect on the male labor 
supply. 
5. See the BMT model for a derivation on this point.   YANG: EDUCATION, MARRIED WOMEN’S PARTICIPATION RATE AND FERTILITY   
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where the letter “b ” is a constant proportion of total production. Parents spend this amount 
of production on education for each child. Term  t l  is the working hours,  t H  is the human 
capital per capita at time  t , and  H  is the stock of “raw labor capital” at the beginning of 






i t n = N  and then  t n  is equal 
to the ratio t t /N N 1 + . 
Each mother is endowed with one unit of labor time. The time is allocated towards 
work, rearing each child (households) and teaching each child. Let  t v  denote the time cost 
of rearing each child while  t h  represents the time of teaching each child. After we 
normalize the time of a mother to unity, the time constraint equation becomes  
 
.  v +n h n l t t t t t + = 1                                                     (3) 
 
From (3), it is easy to see that if a mother works more, she only has less time to stay 
home to teach her children. Notice, however, that with a higher income she can send her 
children to a baby sitter, kindergarten or supplemental school. Alternatively, if she stays 
home, she can teach her children by herself. Both supplemental and home education are 
inputs of the human capital accumulation function. Specifically, we assume a Cobb-Douglas 
function of the human capital accumulation. 
 




t t+ +H H bl h A H =                                             (4) 
 
where the letter “A” denotes a positive technological parameter. Terms  a and  b  are 
shares of the respective inputs in human capital production. We assume that  1 = + b a . We 
use  Equation (4) to capture the idea that formal and in-home schooling are  imperfect 
substitutes in accumulating human capital. Both of them are essential. 
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t t+ +H H bl h A H =  
 
By consecutively using the objective utility function, we can construct the following 
Lagrangian function. 
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where  t l  is the Lagrange multiplier. Applying  Equations (3) and (4) to the Lagrangian 
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First of all, differentiating Equation (6) with respect to the consumption for time  t , 
we obtain the following first-order condition. 
 





1 =                                                       (7) 
 
The left-hand side denotes the shadow price of per capita consumption at time  t . The 
right-hand side of Equation (7) denotes the marginal utility of consumption at time  t . Using 
Equation (7), we can further derive Equation (8) below. 
 






1 = +                                                 ( 8) 
 
The left-hand side of Equation (8) is the ratio of the shadow prices of consumption at time  t  
and  1 + t . Equation (8) equates it to the marginal rate of substitution between the 
consumption at time  t  and  1 + t . 
Secondly, the first-order condition with respect to the human capital at time  1 + t  is  
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+                                       (9) 
 
The left-hand side of Equation (9) represents the marginal value of an additional investment 
on human capital. This measure equals the product of the marginal productivity of human 
capital and the shadow price of consumption. Notice that given the number of children and 
working hours, an increase in the human capital investment at time  1 + t  is possible only 
with an increase in the level of itself at time  t . One can see that the right-hand side 
measures exactly the marginal cost of investment on children’s human capital at time  1 + t . 
Parents will invest  in children’s human capital until its marginal benefit is equal to its 
marginal cost. 
From Equations (8) and (9), we have 
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Equation (10) shows that the marginal rate of substitution between per capita consumption at 
time  t  and  1 + t  is equal to the rate of return in human capital. This rate of return depends 
on  t l ,  1 + t l  and  t n . YANG: EDUCATION, MARRIED WOMEN’S PARTICIPATION RATE AND FERTILITY   
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The left-hand side of Equation (11) denotes the marginal utility from an increase in the total 
number of children at time  t . The right-hand side denotes its cost. Because the total number 
of children at time  t  is born to those born at time  1 - t , an increase in the total number of 
children at time  t  requires a corresponding change in the total number of children at time 
1 - t . Furthermore, at every moment in time, an increase in the total number of children 
incurs two types of cost. The first is the direct cost for raising all children. The first and 
second terms of the right-hand side of Equation (11) denote exactly this cost. The second 
type of cost is an indirect cost. When the number of children increases, it crowds out the 
teaching time per child at home. Therefore, it reduces the pace of accumulating human 
capital. These effects on cost are measured by the third and the fourth terms of (11). 
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The left-hand side of Equation (12) shows the net value of the marginal product of  t l , while 
the right-hand side of Equation (12) stands for the marginal cost of  t l . There are two forces 
acting behind the latter. First, when a mother goes to work, she has less time to teach her 
children at home. This force acts adversely on human capital accumulation. However, the 
mother thereby can pay for the expense of formal or informal schools. This improves the 
human capital accumulation, as what the right-hand side of Equation (12) tells us. 
Using Equation (4), we can simplify Equation (12) into  
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After further arrangement of Equation (13), we have 
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Equation ) 3 1 ( ¢ shows us the relationship between the working hours and fertility rate along an 



















Figure 3.1  The Optimal Path between Working Hours and Fertility Rate 
 
As shown in the figure, other things being equal, when the number of children is 
greater than  n ~ , an increase in the number of children will encourage the mother to spend 
more time working. However, when the number of children is less than  n ~ , female labor 
supply has a negative relationship with fertility. In view of (12), one can see the economic 
intuition behind this interesting relationship. First, from the left-hand side of Equation (12), 
when the fertility rate increases, it affects adversely the marginal benefit of working hours. 
Therefore, it will discourage female labor supply. Second, from the first term of the 
right-hand side of Equation (12), we see that an increase in the fertility rate reduces the time 
of in-home schooling. Therefore, it raises the marginal cost of working hours and 
discourages them. Thirdly, from the second term of the right-hand side in (12), the increase 
in fertility raises total family income, thus lowering the marginal cost of working hours. As a 
result, depending on how these three forces interact with each other, an increase in the 
fertility rate may raise or lower the working hours. 
When fertility increases, a mother alternatively has to spend more of her time taking 
care of her children at home. Therefore, the opportunity cost of working hours increases and 
it discourages female labor supply. However, the increase in fertility also incurs more 
expenditure on children. In order to finance the expense, the mother may spend more time at 
work. This intuitively explains the ambiguous relationship between working hours and 
fertility. We summarize the findings in the following propositions. YANG: EDUCATION, MARRIED WOMEN’S PARTICIPATION RATE AND FERTILITY   
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Proposition 1:  Other things being equal, when the fertility rate is higher than  n ~ , an 
increase in the fertility rate affects positively the female labor participation rate. On the 




Now we can derive the steady state equilibrium from the above equations. First of all, 
in the growth equilibrium the raw labor capital  H   is relatively small. We neglect it in the 
mathematical operation. By combining Equations (10) and (13’), we obtain an explicit 
solution for the steady state variables in our model. Let a variable with an asterisk denotes its 
equilibrium value in the steady state. We thus have 
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The letter ‘g’ stands for the growth rate. By substituting Equations (14) and (15) into 
Equation (16), we obtain 
 
. ] ) ( 1 ][ ) ( 1 [ 1
1 1 * â /å /å á a/b b a/b v b Aá g + a - - =                                (17) 
 
Proposition 2:  In the growth equilibrium, an increase in the proportion of educational 
expenditure (1) raises a mother’s working time, (2) reduces the fertility rate and (3) 
improves the growth rate. 
 
Proposition 2 says intuitively that when the educational expenditure rises, a mother 
will allocate more of her time to work. Therefore, she can invest more in the human capital 
of her children. As a result, the growth rate increases. Also, when the educational 
expenditure becomes more expensive, the cost of having children will be higher. 
Consequently, a mother will have less children and fertility goes down. 
We furthermore obtain the proposition regarding the effect of changes in the fixed time 
cost of rearing children and the degree of altruism toward children. 
 
Proposition 3: (1) An increase in the fixed time cost of children,v , has no effect on fertility. 
It leads to a decrease in the participation rate and the growth rate. (2) A higher degree of 
altruism leads to a decrease in the participation rate and growth rate, but it raises the 
fertility rate. 
 
6. We recognize that the fertility rate is an endogenous variable in our model. However, we believe that it is 
important to report the way that female labor participation is affected by fertility in our model. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
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Propositions 2 and 3 have interesting implications for a growing economy or for 
countries with different environmental states. For example, if several countries have different 
policies on educational expenditure, our model predicts that the growth rate and female 
participation rate will be higher in those countries with higher educational expenditure than 
in the others. However, the fertility rates of the former will be lower than the latter. If, due to 
the lower fixed time cost of children, some countries have higher growth rates than others, 
our model implies that all these countries may have the same fertility rate. Similar reasoning 
may be applied to the cases with different degrees of altruism toward children over time in a 
given country. 
In our model there next exists a stagnant equilibrium. It occurs when the condition 
H  H H t t = = +1 holds. In the stagnant equilibrium, since  t t H H = +1 , Equation (10) becomes 
 







t 1 ) ( ) (
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-                                             (18) 
 
Combining Equations (13) and (18), we can derive the number of children,  s n , in the 
stagnant equilibrium. 
 
. n =  bn) nv Aaá
å â á a - - 1 )( 1 (                                           (19) 
 
From Equation (19), one can verify that the fertility rate in the growth equilibrium 
* n  
is less than that in the stagnant equilibrium  s n . One can also verify that  s n  is greater than 
n ~ . Therefore, we obtain the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 4: The fertility rate is lower in the growth equilibrium than that in the stagnant 
equilibrium. 
 
When the economy is in the stagnant stage, the relatively low rate of return of human 
capital results in a low investment in human capital. A lower level of human capital denotes 
a lower shadow price of children. Consequently, parents would prefer more children to 
investment in children’s human capital, and thus the fertility rate is high. 
A further proposition considers the underdeveloped equilibrium: 
 
Proposition 5: There is no underdeveloped equilibrium with    H H t t 0 1 = = + in our model. 
 
Proof: If  , 0 1 = = + t t H H  by Equation (4) we can obtain 0
1









Equation (13), we have    n 0 = and  1 = l . This means that an inequality must hold for 
Equation (11), i.e., the left-hand side of Equation (11) must be less than the right-hand side. 
However, when the fertility rate  n equals zero, the right-hand side is equal to zero. 
Consequently, the left-hand side of Equation (11) is less than zero. This result conflicts with 
the assumption that consumption must be positive. It proves that the model does not have an 
equilibrium with  0 1 = = + t t H H . YANG: EDUCATION, MARRIED WOMEN’S PARTICIPATION RATE AND FERTILITY   
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In the last part of this section, we use finally a numerical example to demonstrate the 
path of demographic transition. We start with a set of parameter values which drive our 
model into a stagnant equilibrium. We then increase the value of educational expenditure to 
examine its impact on our model. We also show the dynamic transition in our model. Let us 
consider a case with the following values for the parameters in our model:  A= 13,  a = 0.2, 
e= 0.35,  a= 0.6,  b = 0.14,  v = 0.08 and  H = 0.1. 
In this case the economy will grow into a stagnant equilibrium with  s n = 2.539,  s l = 
0.615, and  s H = 3.217. By using the stagnant equilibrium as an initial point, we find that if 
the proportion of educational expenditure  b  rises from 0.14 to 0.15, the model will grow 


















Figure 3.2  The Path of the Fertility Rate 
 
Figure 3.2 demonstrates that an increase in  b  has a negative effect on fertility. It 
drives the fertility rate monotonically down to the growth equilibrium of 2.275. Figure 3.2 
also shows that the path of fertility follows the demographic transition. The high fertility rate 
exists in the stagnant equilibrium in which human capital is low, and an increase in  b  leads 
to an increase in the cost of education. A mother would like to improve the quality of 
children instead of the quantity of children. This leads to a gradual reduction in fertility until 
it reaches the steady state value. 
In Figure 3.3, an increase in the educational expenditure leads to a gradual increase in 
the working hours  t l . It climbs from the stagnant equilibrium value to the growth 
equilibrium with  t l = 0.651. The working time path symbolizes the path of the married 
women participation rate in Taiwan.
7  
 
7. Killingsworth and Heckman (1986) showed this upward trend in the married women’s participation rate in 
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Figure 3.4  The Trend of Married Women’s Participation Rate in Taiwan (1964-1996) 
 
different countries. YANG: EDUCATION, MARRIED WOMEN’S PARTICIPATION RATE AND FERTILITY   
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Figure 3.4 shows the trend in Taiwan’s married women’s participation rate from 1964 
to 1996. From 1976 onwards, there is an increasing trend in the rate, with the increasing 
trend explicitly upward from 1981 to 1987. However after 1987, the trend slows down. 
Referring to Figure 3.3, one can see that it may illustrate the take-off of married women 
participation, which moves from the stagnant equilibrium to the growth equilibrium. The 





















Figure 3.5  The Path of Human Capital 
 
In Figure 3.5, the proportion of educational expenditure  b  is set finally by 0.14. Line 
I  is the path of human capital accumulation. It reaches a stagnant equilibrium where the 
value of human capital is 3.217. If the value of  b  rises to 0.15, its path will gradually reach 
a perpetual growth path from point  W  to point  A, as line  II  shows. As a result, we may 
claim that an autonomous increase in educational expenditure may move the economy from 
an underdeveloped economy to a developed one. 
 
III. Empirical Study 
 
This section tests the propositions of our model and uses the economic growth 
experience of Taiwan as our data set. According to our model, an increase in the proportion 
of educational expenditure leads to an increase in a mother’s working time, a decrease in the 
fertility and an increase in the growth rate. 
Married women’s working hours  l  are not the same as the married women’s 
participation rate. For an empirical test, working hours should be defined as 
F L w F F L w P /h h = /N E /h h = l ) ( ) )( ( . Term  w h  denotes married women’s working hours and JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
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L h  denotes the total hours that married women have. Term  F E  is the number of people in 
the married women’s labor force,  F N  is the number of the population over 15 years old, 
and  F P  is the married women’s participation rate. Because most people allocate one-third 
of their time for work, we approximate the ratio of working hours to total hours as one-third, 





We can find  F P  from the Yearbook of Manpower Survey Statistics, R.O.C. The letter 
“g” denotes the growth rate of per capita real GNP collected from the National Income, 
R.O.C. The letter “n” denotes the married women’s total fertility rate collected from the 
Demographic Statistics R.O.C. Here, the letter “b” is the proportion of educational expense 
in household expenditure collected from the  Report on Family Income and Expenditure 
Survey. The letter “I” is the real disposable income per household. The data is available in 
the Report on Family Income and Expenditure Survey. We use it as a proxy of family income. 
The letter “E” is the average number of years of education that female employees accept. We 
find the data on education in the Yearbook of Manpower Survey Statistics, Taiwan Area, 
R.O.C. In addition to the predetermined variables E, I, and b, we also take per capita GNP, 
i.e., Y, into account. It has some influence on the growth rate g.
8 In our model l, g and n are 
the explained variables. 
We construct an econometric model with a system of structural equations. These 
equations mirror the first-order conditions in our theoretical model. 
 
, 1 3 2 1 0 e a + t t t t Y á + n á + l + á = g                                         (20) 
 
, 2 3 2 1 0 e b b b b + + + + = t t t t E b n l                                          (21) 
 
. 3 3 2 1 0 e d d d d + + + + = t t t t I E b n                                         (22) 
 
The above variables denote their natural-log values, while this research uses the yearly 
data from 1972 to 1998. The three-stage-least-square method is applied to run the 
simultaneous equations. Theoretically, our model predicts that the signs of  1 a  and  2 b  are 
positive, while  2 a ,  3 a  and  1 b  must be negative. The remaining coefficients are indeter- 
minate. The results of our empirical test are reported in Table 3.1. 
The regression result of Equation (20) is reported in the second row of Table 3.1. It 
shows that the married women’s participation rate is positively related to the growth rate as 
expected. Furthermore, the fertility rate is negatively related to the growth rate. The level of 
per capita GNP indeed does negatively affect the growth rate. 
 
8. See EL (1991) for a reference. YANG: EDUCATION, MARRIED WOMEN’S PARTICIPATION RATE AND FERTILITY   
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Table 3.1   The Regression of Simultaneous Equations from First-order Conditions 
  Intercept  l  n  Y  b  E  I 






















n  7.973 
(3.470) 








2  0.8715             
* denotes the 5% level of significance. 
 
The third row in Table 3.1 reports the regression result for Equation (21). It illustrates 
that the married women’s participation rate is negatively related to the fertility rate. The 
coefficient is statistically significant. Consequently, it confirms the prediction of the growth 
equilibrium in Proposition 1. That is, when the fertility rate is below  n ~ , it negatively affects 
the female labor force participation rate. The proportion of educational expenditure has a 
positive effect on the married women’s participation rate, and it is statistically significant. In 
Taiwan educational expenditure indeed is an important factor affecting the female 
participation rate. However, the level of female education significantly and negatively affects 
the participation rate. This result implies that women with higher education will prefer 
staying home to working.   
The fourth row shows that educational expenditure is negatively related to fertility as 
we expected. Since an increase in educational expense raises the cost of educating children, a 
mother prefers the quality of children to quantity. Therefore, she will prefer a small number 
of children. Furthermore, the level of female education shows a negative effect on the 
number of children. This matches the fact that when the m other’s time cost becomes more 
expensive, a better-educated mother will have fewer children. With regard to disposable 
income per household, it is positively related to fertility. The high-income family has more 
children than does the low-income family. 
The above results meet our predictions in Proposition 2. It also shows that our model 
explains very well Taiwan’s growth experience from the aspect of the female labor supply. 
An increase in the proportion of educational expenditure over time leads to an increase in the 
married women’s participation rate and an increase in the growth rate. However, it results in 
a decrease in the fertility rate.
9 
Depending on the level of the fertility rate, Equation (13) predicts finally an 
indeterminate relationship between the fertility rate and female labor participation rate. We 
now use international data to investigate this relationship. We will run different regressions 
of the female participation rate on the fertility rate for countries with different levels of per 
capita GNP. We classify those countries according to low-income, middle-income, and 
 
9. Because of the limited data sets in Taiwan, we could not test whether the time cost of rearing children, v, and the 
degree of altruism, a, affect the growth equilibrium as predicted in Proposition 3. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
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high-income, respectively. Using the World Bank classification, 49 countries are in 
low-income economies, 57 in middle-income economies, and 24 in high-income economies. 
The empirical results are reported in Table 3.2. 
 
Table 3.2   The Regressions of Female Labor Force Participation Rate 
on the Fertility Rate for Different-income Economies 


















2  0.0101  0.4200  0.0003 
Note: The data are collected from “World Development Report” (1996). 
 
In Table 3.2 the female labor force participation rates are positively related to the total 
fertility rate in the low-income countries. On the other hand, a negative relationship exists 
between the female participation rates and fertility rates in the middle and high-income 
countries. This outcome supports the hypothesis in Proposition 1 and implies that in 
underdeveloped economies, a higher fertility rate coincides with a higher female labor force 
participation. Since most developing countries engage in agriculture, women who work on 
the farm near their house can work as well as take care of their children. As countries 
become more advanced, their service industry develops and attracts more women willing to 
find jobs in this industry. On the other hand, in the more developed economies, high female 




During the process of economic growth, the interaction between fertility and female 
labor supply is significant. However, few studies discuss together the relationship between 
female labor supply, fertility and growth. Taiwan’s economic development shows the fact 
that during 1960s and 1970s, female earnings not only subsidized part of the family’s 
necessary expenses, but also contributed to the investment on human capital of family 
members. As an economy develops, a mother cannot just stay home to teach her children as 
before.
10 She has to join the job market, and further accumulate her own human capital and 
financial ability. The financial support for children’s human capital becomes more important, 
and even surpasses mother’s time of teaching at home. 
Our study combines these two factors as the inputs of children’s learning capacity. 
Through educational expenditure, we connect female labor supply, fertility and growth. We 
obtain that a high-income country can be characterized with high female participation, low 
fertility and high growth. A low-income country has the opposite characteristics. 
Furthermore, low-income countries may move from an undeveloped stage to a developed 
 
10. See Lui (1983). YANG: EDUCATION, MARRIED WOMEN’S PARTICIPATION RATE AND FERTILITY   
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stage, if they raise the proportion of household educational expenditure. Governments may 
deduct the educational expenditure from a household’s income tax to encourage parents' 
educational expenditure. With respect to time-series data in Taiwan and data across countries 
in the world, our empirical results justify the model’s predictions. 
There are many other factors such as social and cultural changes that affect the 
interrelationship between female labor supply, fertility and growth. For example, one is the 
social norm of accepting female worker in different position. In order to explore the real 
aspect of the interaction between mothers’ working decision and children’s quantity and 
quality, we will extend our model to include the role of husbands. Finally, the proportion of 
educational expenditure can be an endogenous variable affected by i ncome. To further 





Becker, G.S., and H.G. Lewis (1973), “On the Interaction between the Quantity and Quality 
of Children,” Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 81, No. 2 (pt.2), S279-288. 
Becker, G.S., K.M. Murphy, and R. Tamura (1990), “Human Capital, Fertility and Economic 
Growth,” Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 98, No. 5, S12-S37.   
Ehrlich, I ., and F .T. Lui  (1991),  “Intergenerational Trade, Longevity, and Economic 
Growth,” Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 99, No. 5, 1029-1059. 
Galor, O., and D.N. Weil (1996), “The Gender Gap, Fertility, and Growth,” The American 
Economic Review, Vol. 86, No. 3, 374-387. 
Goldin, C. (1986), “The Female Labor Force and American Economic Growth, 1890-1980,” 
Long-Term Factors in American Economic Growth, eds. by S.L. Engerman and R.E. 
Gallman, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago. 
Hill, C.R., and F .P. Stafford  (1974), “Allocation of Time to Preschool Children and 
Educational Opportunity,” The Journal of Human Resources, Vol. IX, No. 3, 323-341. 
Killingsworth, and Heckman  (1986), “Female Labor Supply: A Survey,” in Handbook of 
Labor Economics, eds. by A. Orley and R. Layard, The Netherlands: Elsevier Science 
Publishers B.V., Vol. 1, 103-204. 
Leibowitz, A. (1977), “Parental Inputs and Children’s Achievement,” The Journal of Human 
Resources, Vol. 12, No. 2, 242-251. 
Liu, P.K.C. (1983), “Trend in Female Labor Force Participation in Taiwan: The Transition 
toward Higher Technology Activities,” Academia Economic Papers, Vol. 11,  No.  1, 
293-323. 
Malthus, T.R. (1798), First Essay on Population, Reprints of Economic Classics, A. Kelley, 
New York, NY, 1965. 
Mincer, J. (1962), “Labor  Force Participation of Married Women,” in Aspects of Labor 
Economics,  ed. by H.G. Lewis  et al., Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 
63-105. 
_____ (1985), “Intercountry Comparisons of Labour Force Trends and of Related 
Development: an Overview,” Journal of Labor Economics, Vol. 3, No.1, S1-S30. 
National Income in Taiwan Area, R.O.C. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
  118 
Report on the Family Income and Expenditure Survey. 
Standing, G. (1983), “Women’s Work Activity and Fertility,” in Determinants of Fertility in 
Developing Countries: A Summary of Knowledge, Vol.  1, eds. by Bulatao and R.D. 
Lee, New York: Academic Press, 517-545. 
Taiwan-Fukien Demographic Fact Book, Republic of China. 
Yearbook of Manpower Survey Statistics, Taiwan Area, Republic of China. 